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Marco Longobardo
Abstract
The interplay between public and private actors in the exploitation of natural resources in an 
occupied territory makes the regime of state and individual responsibility particularly complex in 
cases of exploitation by private actors that result in breach of international humanitarian law. The 
Occupying Power has the duty not to deplete the natural resources of the occupied territory and, 
according to the case law of the International Court of Justice, it must also ensure that private actors 
do not exploit the natural resources of the occupied territory in violation of international 
humanitarian law. This paper explores the legal basis of this duty of vigilance and the consequences 
of the Occupying Power’s responsibility for the acts of private actors.
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21 Introduction
The law of belligerent occupation has received significant academic attention in recent 
decades.1 This essay explores the interplay between public (the Occupying Power) and private (eg 
companies and corporations) actors in the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory. 
In particular, it focuses on the Occupying Power’s international responsibility for acts of 
exploitation of natural resources in violation of international humanitarian law that are committed 
by private actors, with attention also to the relevant issues of individual criminal liability. For the 
purposes of this essay, the expression ‘illegal exploitation’ refers to exploitation of natural resources 
in violation of international humanitarian law only.
This essay does not specifically address the related topic of the accountability of corporations 
and companies for the exploitation of natural resources under international human rights law,2 nor 
does it examine international human rights law obligations incumbent upon the Occupying Power.3 
Suffice it to say that it is well established that the Occupying Power must comply with the rules of 
international human rights law when it acts in the occupied territory,4 and the rules regarding 
property, economic, and social rights are extremely relevant for the exploitation of natural 
resources.5 
The subject of the exploitation of natural resources in armed conflict6 and, specifically, in times 
of belligerent occupation,7 has been studied extensively by scholars. However, state responsibility 
for violations committed by private actors has not been explored in depth from an international 
humanitarian law perspective; this is quite strange since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
discussed this issue in the case of the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. 
Uganda).8
1
 See eg Arai-Takahashi (2009); Dinstein (2009); Kolb, Vité (2009); Koutroulis (2010); Annoni (2012); Benvenisti 
(2012); Carcano (2015); Sassòli (2015).
2
 On the accountability of companies and corporations for human rights violations, see, among many others, De 
Schutter (2006); Bonfanti (2012); Chetail (2014).
3
 See, among others, Wilde (2009); Lubell (2012); Ferraro (2013).
4
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] 
ICJ Rep 126, para. 106 (Wall opinion); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda) (Judgment) 
[2005] ICJ Rep 168, para. 216.
5
 With specific regard to the role of international human rights law in the exploitation of natural resources in times of 
occupation, see Scobbie (2011).
6
 See eg Okowa (2007); Tignino (2011); Pertile (2013); Dam-de Jong (2015).
7
 See eg Cassese (1992); Scobbie (1997); Benvenisti (2003); Longobardo (2015).
8
 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4. On the Court’s findings regarding the exploitation of natural resources, see Cervell Hortal 
(2006); Dufresne (2008); Cimiotta (2011).
3This paper attempts to fill the void in scholarship surrounding state responsibility by focusing 
on the narrow context of state responsibility for private actors exploiting natural resources. 
Accordingly, this paper begins by analysing the rules concerning the exploitation of natural 
resources in times of belligerent occupation. The paper goes on to test the rules on international 
responsibility for such exploitative activity in order to verify whether acts of private actors are 
attributable to the Occupying Power. Moreover, this paper considers the merits of the existence of a 
duty to prevent private actors from illegally exploiting natural resources in the occupied territory. 
The paper also draws some conclusions regarding the consequence of acts of exploitation of natural 
resources in the occupied territory as a matter of individual criminal responsibility of both state 
organs and private actors.
2 The Relationship Between the Occupying Power and Natural Resources in the 
Occupied Territory
The law of belligerent occupation is codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR),9 in the 1949 
Fourth Geneva Convention (IV GC),10 and in the 1977 First Protocol Additional to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions (AP I).11 It is well established that the rules embodied in the HR and in the IV 
GC reflect general international law,12 while only some AP I provisions enjoy customary status.13 
Belligerent occupation is effective control of territory gained during an armed conflict and 
without the consent of the sovereign of that territory.14 According to Article 42 HR, which reflects 
customary international law,15 ‘[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under 
the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority 
has been established and can be exercised.’ Accordingly, the law of belligerent occupation applies 
irrespectively of the fact that the Occupying Power declares the territory to be occupied or contests 
this assumption.16 
9
 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907 (HR).
10
 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (IV GC).
11
 First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 (AP I).
12
 Wall opinion, supra n.  4, para. 89; Meron (1987). 
13
 Roberts (1990), p. 54; Dinstein (2009), pp. 7–8. For the identification of customary international humanitarian law 
rules is extremely helpful the study by Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (2005) vol. I.
14
 See DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 173. See also Roberts (1985) pp. 251–252; Benvenisti (2012), p. 3.
15
 Wall opinion, supra n. 4, para. 78; DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 172.
16
 Greenwood (1992), p. 250.
4During belligerent occupations, there is a divide between sovereignty, which is vested in the 
ousted government or in the population of the occupied territory, and the Occupying Power’s 
temporary responsibility for governmental functions. The Occupying Power – notwithstanding its 
exercise of powers and functions that are similar to those that were exercised by the ousted 
sovereign before the occupation – does not acquire sovereignty over the occupied territory since the 
evolution of international law, particularly the emergence of the principle of self-determination of 
peoples and the ban on the use of force, prevents the Occupying Power from conquering the 
territory it occupies.17 
Several international humanitarian law provisions exclude acquisition of sovereignty by the 
Occupying Power. According to Article 43 HR, the Occupying Power has to respect, unless 
absolutely prevented from doing so, the law in force in the occupied territory.18 Moreover, Article 
47 IV GC prescribes that protected persons in the occupied territory enjoy the rights embodied in 
the convention notwithstanding any change introduced in the territory and any annexation. Finally, 
Article 4 AP I unequivocally affirms that the occupation of a territory does not affect its legal status.
Breaking the normal parallelism between exercise of governmental functions and legal 
entitlement to do so, belligerent occupation appears to be a state of exception in international 
relations.19 Thus, it is a necessarily temporary situation that may end only with the restitution of the 
territory to the ousted sovereign or an act of volition of the ousted sovereign that confers on the 
Occupying Power legal title to the territory.20 Accordingly, even if prolonged occupations occur, 
they inevitably must terminate sooner or later.21
These principles are reflected in the international humanitarian law provisions regarding the 
exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory. Natural resources can be categorised as 
either public or private property depending on the domestic law of the occupied territory in force 
before the beginning of the occupation.22 On the basis of the private or public nature of the 
property, different international rules apply.
With regard to natural resources that are public property, according to Article 55 HR the 
Occupying Power is ‘administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and 
17
 See Affaire de la Dette Publique Ottomane (Bulgaria, Irak, Palestine, Transjordan, Greece, Italy and Turkey [1925] 
RIAA 529, p. 555. See also Pellet (1992), pp. 244–245; Korman (1996), pp. 218–230; Dinstein (2009), pp. 49–52. 
Accordingly, the ECJ refused to qualify as ‘made in Israel’ products manufactured by companies located in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (ECJ, Case C-386/08, 25 February 2010; for a commentary, see Fornari (2013)).
18
 For more on this provision, see Section 4.3.2.
19
 See Benvenisti (2012), p. vii; Ben-Naftali (2012); Bothe (2015), p. 1460.
20
 Greenwood (1992), pp. 244–245; Ben-Naftali (2012), p. 546.
21
 On the difference between the expressions ‘temporary’ and ‘lasting only a short time’, see Koutroulis (2012), p. 167. 
On prolonged occupation, see generally Roberts (1990); Scobbie (2015).
22
 Van den Herik, Dam-de Jong (2011), p. 252; Bothe (2015), p. 1477.
5agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State’. This provision clearly reinforces the idea that the 
Occupying Power does not acquire sovereignty over the occupied territory.23 However, the 
Occupying Power may legitimately take possessions of movable natural resources if they may be 
used for military operations pursuant to Article 53 HR.24 
Although these provisions refer only to natural resources owned by the ousted sovereign, the 
provision of Article 47 HR forbidding pillaging25 pertains to the appropriation of both private and 
public property.26 In addition, Article 46 HR specifically protects private property, and this 
provision also covers private natural resources that are owned by individuals.27 Privately owned war 
materials may be seized pursuant to Article 53(2) HR, but they must be restored or compensated at 
the end of the occupation. Moreover, Article 52 HR regarding requisitions and contributions is 
sometimes mentioned in order to affirm that exploitation of natural resources owned by private 
parties is admissible if required by the need of the occupying army.28   
One can conclude that the Occupying Power is not absolutely precluded from exploiting natural 
resources in the occupied territory. Rather, it may lawfully sustain its own occupation thanks to the 
exploitation of natural resources located in the occupied territory. However, since the Occupying 
Power does not have sovereignty over the occupied territory and the occupation is a temporary 
situation,29 the Occupying Power must not deplete the natural resources in the occupied territory, as 
the territory itself must be returned to the ousted sovereign at the end of the occupation.30
23 This provision was debated in length by the Supreme Court of Israel in the case HCJ 2164/09, Yesh Din v. 
Commander of the IDF Forces et al., 26 December 2011 (Yesh Din case), unofficial English translation at 
www.hamoked.org/images/psak.pdf. In the same decision, the Court held that the prolonged nature of the occupation 
allows a more flexible interpretation of Article 43 regarding the exploitation of natural resources (ibid., paras. 9–13). It 
is not possible to analyse here the Court’s reasoning regarding this issue, which has been strongly criticized by several 
scholars (see eg Kratzmer (2012), pp. 220-222; Pace (2012)).
24
 According to Article 53 HR, ‘[a]n army of occupation can only take possession of . . . all movable property belonging 
to the State which may be used for military operations.’ The Court of Appeal of Singapore excluded that crude oil in the 
ground may fall into the definition of movable property pursuant to Article 53 (Court of Appeal, Singapore, N.V. De 
Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij & Ors. v. The War Damage Commission, 13 April 1956, 23 ILR 810, p. 822.
25
 See also Articles 28 HR and 33(3) IV GC.
26
 See eg Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6(b); ICTY Statute, Article 3(e); ICTY, The Prosecutor 
v. Zejnil Delalić and Others (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998), para. 590; SCSL, The Prosecutor v. Sam 
Hinga Norman and Others (Decision on Motion of Acquittal) SCSL-04-14-T (21 October 2005), para. 102 (‘The 
Chamber observes that the terms “pillage”, “plunder” and “spoliation” have been varyingly used to describe the 
unlawful appropriation of private and public property during armed conflict’); The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, 
Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014), para. 904; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment, ICC-
01/05-01/08-3343 (21 March 2016), para. 115.
27
 See Cassese (1992), p. 421; Scobbie (1997), pp. 228–231; Bothe (2015), p. 1477.
28
 See Scobbie (1997), pp. 228–231.
29
 See, eg US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, In re Krupp (1948) 15 AD 620, p. 622: ‘[I]f as a result of war action, a 
belligerent occupies a territory of the adversary, he does not, thereby, acquire the right to dispose of property in that 
territory, except according to the strict rules laid down in the Regulations.’
6This conclusion is consistent with the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, a norm which is both part of customary international law31 and embodied in treaty 
provisions and General Assembly resolutions.32 Since this rule originated as a corollary of the 
principle of self-determination of peoples – which is applicable even during belligerent occupation33 
– the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is applicable even in times of 
belligerent occupation,34 as confirmed by the practice of the UN Security Council and General 
Assembly.35 Accordingly, it is not possible to share the contrary opinion of the ICJ on this issue.36 
3 State and Individual Responsibility for Acts of Illegal Exploitation 
Attributable to the Occupying Power 
The rules on international responsibility are applicable also in cases of international 
humanitarian law violations.37 These rules have developed in general international law and have 
been recently codified by the International Law Commission in the non-binding – albeit greatly 
authoritative – Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft 
Articles).38 Normally states are held responsible for acts of their organs in breaches of international 
law. However, even acts of individuals that are not de jure organs of the state may involve the 
responsibility of a state. In this respect, one has to make a distinction between the issue of the 
attribution of individuals’ conduct to a state – which means that the state may be held responsible 
30
 Arai-Takahashi (2009), pp. 209–210; Dinstein (2009), p. 215; Benvenisti (2003), pp. 869–870; Bothe (2015), p. 
1477; Van Engeland (2015), p. 1544.
31
 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 244. On this principle, see generally Brownlie (1979); Schrijver (1997); 
Bungenberg, Howe (2015).
32
 See eg Article 1 (2) common to the UN International Covenants on Human Rights; UNGA Res. 1803 (XVII) (14 
December 1962), UN Doc. A/RES/1803; UNGA Res. 2158 (XXI) (25 November 1966), UN Doc. A/RES/2158; UNGA 
Res. 3171 (XXVIII) (17 December 1973), UN Doc. A/RES/3171; UNGA Res. 3201 (S-V I) (1 May 1974), UN Doc. 
A/RES/3201; UNGA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (12 December 1974), UN Doc. A/RES/3281.
33
 Wall opinion, supra n. 4, para. 88.
34
 See eg Cassese (1992), p. 426; Scobbie (1997), pp. 247–253; Schrijver (1997), pp. 143–160; Cimiotta (2011), pp. 76–
78; Tignino (2011), p. 259; Longobardo (2015), pp. 344–346.
35
 For the Security Council practice, see eg UNSC Res. 1483 (22 May 2003), UN Doc. S/RES/1483, preamble and 
paras. 14, 20; UNSC Res. 1511 (16 October 2003), UN Doc. S/RES/1511, preamble; UNSC Res. 1546 (8 June 2004), 
UN Doc. S/RES/1546, preamble and para. 3. For the General Assembly practice, see eg UNGA Res. 64/185 (29 
January 2010), UN Doc. A/RES/64/185; UNGA Res. 66/225 (29 March 2012), UN Doc. A/RES/66/225; UNGA Res. 
67/229 (9 April 2013), UN Doc. A/RES/67/229; UNGA Res. 69/241 (2 February 2015), UN Doc. A/RES/69/241.
36
 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 244.
37
 See Sassòli (2002); Fleck (2006). The relevance of the law of international responsibility in times of occupation is 
specifically noted by Benvenisti (2012), p. 18.
38
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, in Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (Draft Articles with 
Commentaries). 
7for those actions – and the issue of state responsibility for acts of private actors that are not 
attributable to the state.39
The rules embodied in the HR – provisions regarding the exploitation of natural resources 
included – were drafted from an inter-state perspective, and they were meant to address behaviours 
of the armed forces of the belligerents. Members of the armed forces are de jure state organs and, 
accordingly, pursuant to the Draft Articles, the Occupying Power is internationally responsible for 
illegal exploitation committed by the commander of the occupied area and by every member of the 
occupying forces since their acts are automatically attributable to the Occupying Power.40 In the 
words of the ICJ, ‘[t]he conduct of the [Uganda People’s Defence Force] as a whole is clearly 
attributable to Uganda, being the conduct of a State organ. According to a well-established rule of 
international law, which is of customary character, “the conduct of any organ of a State must be 
regarded as an act of that State”’41 However, one has to note that the attribution of acts committed 
by members of the armed forces is slightly different from the ordinary regime: while the conduct of 
a state organ is attributable to the state only if it acts in its official capacity,42 the ICJ considered that 
every act committed by a member of the armed forces is attributable to the state pursuant to Article 
3 of the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention and Article 91 AP I.43 Accordingly, it is not relevant 
whether the organ acted privately or officially in order to trigger state responsibility.
Moreover, a wrongful act is attributable to a state if it is committed by individuals directed or 
controlled by the state, and by individuals whose conduct is acknowledged and adopted by a State 
as its own.44 In these cases, the individuals are usually qualified as de facto state organs.45 
Accordingly, acts of illegal exploitation committed by de jure or de facto organs of the 
Occupying Power trigger state responsibility on the basis of their attribution to the state. On the 
other hand, the same individuals – irrespective of their qualification as state organs – may face 
international criminal prosecution for their acts of illegal exploitation. 
In this regard, even if international criminal law does not address directly the protection of 
natural resources, several scholars argue that the war crime of pillaging pursuant to Article 
8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) may apply to acts 
of illegal exploitation.46 The International Criminal Court has not had the chance to pass judgment 
39
 On the issue of attribution, see, among others, Condorelli (1984). 
40
 See Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n. 38, Articles 4, 7.
41
 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 213.
42
 See Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n. 38, p. 42, and the international case law mentioned therein.
43
 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 214.
44
 Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n. 38, Articles 8, 11.
45
 See generally Palchetti (2007); Palchetti (2012).
46
 See eg Stewart (2010); Lundberg (2008); Keenan (2014); Tiwari (2016).
8on this issue yet; however, from the ICC Statute and the Elements of Crimes it is plausible that 
unlawful exploitation of natural resources in times of occupation may amount to the war crime of 
pillaging47 – an idea recently supported by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.48  Indeed, even if the 
ICC Statute provisions regarding pillage were drafted with personal belongings and movable 
properties in mind, the ICJ affirmed clearly that plundering natural resources in the occupied 
territory amounts to pillaging.49 Moreover, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, pillage may refer also to ‘the seizure of property undertaken within the 
framework of a systemic economic exploitation of occupied territory’.50 Finally, there is a 
consistency between the fact that the exploitation of natural resources is lawful if justified by 
military operations and that the war crime of pillaging only encompasses appropriation for private 
or personal purposes.
In brief, with respect to illegal exploitation committed by de jure or de facto state organs, the 
Occupying Power may be held responsible for the violations of the international humanitarian rules 
regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory; the same state organs, 
individually, may be prosecuted for the war crime of pillaging.
4 State and Individual Responsibility for Acts of Illegal Exploitation Committed 
by Private Actors in the Occupied Territory
4.1 Introductory Remarks
The concept of a de facto state organ does not encompass individuals who act without any link 
to a state. Such individuals are commonly referred to as private actors. 
In times of belligerent occupation, it happens that private actors that are not organs of the 
Occupying Power exploit the natural resources in the occupied territory. For instance, during the 
Ugandan occupation of the Ituri region in DRC, the exploitation of the local natural resources was 
undertaken by both members of the Ugandan armed forces and private businessmen and 
47
 Van den Herik  Dam-de Jong (2011), pp. 272–273. For a discussion of the possibility of punishing illegal exploitation 
of natural resources under different war crime definitions, see ibid, pp. 256–261.
48
 See Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (15 September 2016), para. 41, 
available at www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf.
49
 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 245.
50
 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić and Others, supra n. 26, para. 590; The Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, IT-95-14-T 
(3 March 2000), para. 184. 
9entrepreneurs.51 Similarly, some UN bodies and NGOs have affirmed that the exploitation of 
natural resources in the West Bank by Israeli settlers is supported and carried out through private 
companies, both Israeli and foreign.52  
Because of the involvement of private actors in the illegal exploitation of natural resources in 
the occupied territory, it is necessary to explore whether the Occupying Power is internationally 
responsible for such illegal exploitation as a matter of international humanitarian law, and the 
relevant issues regarding individual criminal responsibility.
One should note that, as a matter of international human rights law, the Occupying Power has 
the duty to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights in the occupied territory. In international human 
rights law, ‘protect’ means that a state must prevent and punish interference with human rights that 
are committed by third parties. The case law of international courts and tribunals is well established 
on this point.53
With regard to the activities of companies in light of international humanitarian law, the 
situation is more uncertain.54 Therefore, it is necessary to explore the law of belligerent occupation 
and the law of state responsibility in order to find out whether private acts in violation of 
international humanitarian law involve the responsibility of the Occupying Power. At least two 
main options could be examined.
4.2 Grounds for the Occupying Power’s Responsibility for Illegal Exploitation Committed by 
Private Actors 
4.2.1 Occupying Power’s Direct Responsibility for Acts of Illegal Exploitation
51
 See Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (16 October 2002), UN Doc. S/2002/1146, para. 98.
52
 See e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur Richard Falk on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian 
Territories Occupied Since 1967 (19 September 2012), UN Doc. A/67/379, paras. 55–57, 72–74; Human Rights Watch, 
Occupation, Inc.: How Settlement Businesses Contribute to Israel’s Violations of Palestinian Rights (2016) 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/israel0116_web.pdf.
53
 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligations Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant (26 May 2004), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 8; Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Comment 19: Violence against Women (1992), UN Doc. 
A/47/38, para. 9; Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Judgment, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, No. 4 
(29 July 1988), paras. 172, 174; The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm No. 155/96 (13–27 October 
2011). See also Osman v. United Kingdom (Case 87/1997/871/1083) (2000) 29 EHRR 245, para. 115, and many other 
subsequent decisions of the ECtHR, commented upon in Spielmann (2016).
54
 On this topic, the International Committee of the Red Cross has published a non-binding paper that does not provide 
significant insights: Business and International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of 
Business Enterprises Under International Humanitarian Law (International Committee of the Red Cross 2006) 
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0882.pdf.
10
First, it may be argued that the Occupying Power is responsible for having tolerated such acts 
in the territory under its control. In this case, the Occupying Power would be considered directly 
responsible for the violations of the relevant international humanitarian law rules. 
This conclusion could be drawn by applying to the instant issue the theory that Hugo Grotius 
formulated regarding state responsibility for acts of private actors committed within the boundaries 
of a state. According to Grotius, in these cases, a State (rectius: the King) may be held directly 
responsible for having violated international law only if it has not punished the perpetrators due to 
its own culpa,55 since it has tolerated (patientia) and thus, accepted (receptus) the acts of private 
actors located in its territory.56 On this basis, more recent authors have developed the so-called 
‘theory of complicity’, according to which a state is directly responsible for acts of private actors if 
it fails to prosecute them.57 
Grotius’ theory and its developments have the advantage of immediately allocating 
responsibility for a breach of international law to a state, which is the subject of international law 
par excellence. However, in the case of the Occupying Power’s responsibility, it would be 
considered responsible for an international wrongful act – the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources – that is not attributable on the basis of the customary rules on international responsibility 
codified in the Draft Articles. 
In the alternative, one might argue that a special secondary rule58 on attribution of the conduct 
of private actors during belligerent occupation exists in international customary law and that it 
prevails as lex specialis on the rules codified in the International Law Commission on the basis of 
Article 55 Draft Articles. However, such a rule in not embodied in any international humanitarian 
law convention, nor is there any relevant opinio juris and state practice on its existence qua 
customary law. Accordingly, the view of the Occupying Power being directly responsible for acts of 
private actors should be considered out of line with contemporary international law.
4.2.2 Occupying Power’s Direct Responsibility for Not Having Prevented Acts of Illegal 
Exploitation
55
 Grotius (1964), p. 436.
56
 See the remarks of Russeau (1983), pp. 15–16; Ago (1940), p. 178. 
57
 See eg De Vattel (1802), p. 72; Bluntchli (1873), p. 264. For more on this, see Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its twenty-seventh session, UN Doc. A/10010/Rev1, in [1975-II] Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 81.
58
 For the distinction between primary and secondary rules, see David (2010).
11
Second, it is possible to shift the attention from secondary rules regarding the attribution of 
wrongful acts to states to the field of the relevant primary rules. In fact, the law of international 
responsibility considers that a state may be held responsible for the conduct of private persons only 
if it has assumed the role of guarantor for certain conduct or events to either happen or not happen.
59
In cases of private actors violating the rules pertaining to the exploitation of natural resources 
in the occupied territory, there is room to argue that the Occupying Power is not responsible for the 
violations of the aforementioned conventional rules of jus in bello. On the contrary, the Occupying 
Power may be considered responsible for the violation of an autonomous and different rule, whose 
content is the duty to prevent private actors from violating international humanitarian law.
This second option has a notable advantage. It considers the Occupying Powers to be 
internationally responsible only for conduct that is attributable to it on the basis of the law of 
international responsibility.  
Accordingly, one has to find such primary rule concerned with the Occupying Power’s duty to 
prevent international humanitarian law violations committed by private articles. The problem is that 
there is not a specific provision regarding the Occupying Power’s duty to prevent private actors’ 
illegal exploitation in the international humanitarian law conventions. However, this duty can be 
inferred from more general provisions. In this regard, at least two options are available.
4.3 In Search of an Autonomous Duty to Prevent Private Actors from Violating International 
Humanitarian Law in the Occupied Territory
4.3.1 Article 1 Common to the Four Geneva Conventions
First, one could consider that Article 1 common to the Four Geneva Conventions (common 
Article 1) embodies the duty of the contracting parties to ensure private actors’ respect for 
international humanitarian law, rules on the exploitation of natural resources included.60 According 
to common Article 1, ‘[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
the present Convention in all circumstances’. This provision has been widely debated among 
publicists in search of an interpretation of the expression ‘ensure respect’, which seems to imply 
something different from the duty to respect the convention.61
59
 Anzilotti (1906), pp. 14–15. More recently, see Wolfrum (2005), p. 425; De Frouville (2010), pp. 277–280.
60
 See Koutroulis (2006), pp. 728–735.
61
 See, generally, Pictet (1951), pp. 15–17; Condorelli, Boisson De Chazournes (1984); Boisson De Chazournes, 
Condorelli (2000); Focarelli (2010); Kolb (2013); Geiβ (2015); Henckaerts (2016).
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In some scholars’ opinions, the duty to ensure respect for the Conventions pursuant to common 
Article 1 is also related to the acts of private actors that are under the authority of one of the 
contracting states.62 This interpretation is supported by the travaux preparatoires,63 by some 
military manuals,64 and by the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.65 
Accordingly, the Occupying Power is under a duty of due diligence, which is an obligation of 
conduct, regarding private actors violations, on the basis of common Article 1.66
In evaluating this option, however, one should take into account some factors that, without 
entirely excluding this view’s soundness, shed some doubts on its actual relevance in cases of 
occupation. First, the text of common Article 1 specifically refers only to the obligations embodied 
in the Four Geneva Conventions, while the rules regarding the exploitation of natural resources are 
codified in the HR. Only according to one author does the obligation to ensure respect explicitly 
regard rules embodied in the HR;67 this author refers to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’ study on customary international humanitarian law that prescribes a duty to ensure respect 
only with regards to acts of members of the armed forces and other persons or groups acting on a 
belligerent’s instructions, or under its direction or control.68 This reference is not relevant since, as 
mentioned afore, these individuals fall into the definition of de facto organs, while in the case at 
hand, the acts are committed by private actors. Moreover, since they are state organs – even if de 
facto rather than de jure – their conduct fall under the state’s duty to respect the Geneva 
Conventions, rather than under the duty to ensure respect.
Second, the application of common Article 1 to private actors’ conduct is not mentioned in 
international case law. For instance, the ICJ has invoked the duty to ensure respect pursuant to 
common Article 1 mainly in order to emphasise the erga omnes / erga omnes partes character of the 
duties embodied in the Four Geneva Conventions.69 In these same occasions, the ICJ never 
mentioned that such a duty exists with respect to the HR. Moreover, the ICJ did not mention 
62
 Sassòli (2002), p. 412; Geiβ (2015), p. 118; Henckaerts (2016), paras. 33–35. 
63
 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. II-B, 53.
64
 See eg the military manuals of Kenya, Russia, and Switzerland, cited in Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (2005) vol. II, pp. 
3161–3162.
65
 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Mapiripán Massacre case, Judgment, 15 September 2005, para. 114.
66
 See Sassòli (2002), p. 412; Geiβ (2015), p. 118; Henckaerts (2016), paras. 33–35. On the concepts of due diligence 
and obligations of conduct, see Section 4.4. 
67
 See Henckaerts (2016), para. 16.
68
 See Rule 139 in Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck (2005) vol. I, p. 495.
69
 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 
14, para. 220; Wall opinion, supra n. 4, paras. 158–159; DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, 
para. 34. This view is far from uncontroversial in legal scholarship; for instance, it was advocated by Condorelli, 
Boisson De Chazournes (1984), and criticised by Focarelli (2010).
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common Article 1 in dealing with acts of illegal exploitation committed by private actors in the 
occupied territory.70
As I will argue in the subsection below, there is a provision dealing only with private actors’ 
conduct in occupied territory, rather than in every circumstances – Article 43 HR. Accordingly, 
Article 43 HR should be regarded as the source of the Occupying Power’s duty since it is a 
provision more specifically pertaining to belligerent occupation – and, thus, it should be applied 
instead of the concurring provision of common Article 1 as a matter of lex specialis. However, this 
conclusion does not impair the relevance of common Article 1 with respect of private actors’ 
conduct in breach of international humanitarian law; rather, common Article 1 is a less correct 
source of duties regarding private actors than Article 43 HR, which applies only in the specific 
circumstance of belligerent occupation.
4.3.2 Article 43 HR
Article 43 HR is the most important provision regarding the duties and rights of the Occupying 
Power, a sort of legal framework in which every specific provision pertaining to the administration 
of the occupied territory finds its justification.71 The Occupying Power must comply with the duties 
embodied in Article 43 HR even if it chooses not to establish a formally structured administration in 
the occupied territory.72 Article 64 IV GC complements article 43 HR.73 
According to Article 43 HR, the Occupying Power ‘shall take all the measures in his power to 
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and [civil life], while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’74 Consequently, Article 43 HR could be read 
as the source of the Occupying Power’s duty to prevent private actors from illegally exploiting 
natural resources. 
Article 43 HR is comprised of a set of obligations that are the core objectives of the 
administration of the occupied territory. These duties include the duty to restore and ensure public 
order, which encompasses ‘responsibility for preserving order, punishing crime, and protecting lives 
70
 For the ICJ’s reasoning on this issue in DRC v. Uganda, see Section 4.3.2. 
71
 See Supreme Court of Israel, Yesh Din case, supra n. 23, para. 8. On the centrality of Article 43 HR, see Sassòli 
(2005); Benvenisti (2012), p. 69; Longobardo (2015), pp. 323–338. 
72
 See DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 310. See also Dinstein (2009), pp. 55–56. 
73
 On this provision, which is not particularly relevant for the instant issue, see Pictet (1951), pp. 334–337.
74
 Actually, the non-authoritative English text refers to ‘safety’ rather than to ‘civil life’. This is a blatant error of 
translation since the word ‘safety’ does not mean the same as ‘vie publique’ (in the original and authoritative French 
text). See Schwenk (1945), p. 393; Dinstein (2009), p. 89; Benvenisti (2012), p. 68.
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and property within the occupied territory’,75 the duty to restore and ensure civil life, which 
encompasses the ‘whole social, commercial and economic life of the community’76, and ‘a variety 
of aspects of civil life, such as the economy, society, education, welfare, health, [and] transport’,77 
as well as the duty to respect, sauf empêchement absolu, the laws in force in the territory – an  
obligation that pertains to the way in which the Occupying Power has to implement its duties to 
restore and ensure public order and civil life, as demonstrated by the text itself of Article 43 HR 
(‘while respecting. . .’ and ‘en respectant. . .’). This last duty to respect the laws in force in the 
occupied territory is relevant for the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory since 
the Occupying Power may not lawfully pass new legislation in order to enable private actors to 
exploit the natural resources in the occupied territory. Consequently, new contracts may be 
concluded only as long as they are based on the law in force before the beginning of the occupation, 
and are not valid after the end of the occupation since they should be seen as the product of the will 
of the Occupying Power.78 
However, it is submitted here that Article 43 HR contains yet another obligation regarding the 
duty to prevent private actors from illegally exploiting natural resources. This duty is not written in 
the text of the provision, but it can be construed through implications. 
Article 43 HR puts forward the aims and the duties of the Occupying Power’s administration in 
broader terms. Along with this provision, the law of belligerent occupation embodies a number of 
specific provisions that limit the Occupying Power’s discretion regarding its administration. It 
would be  illogical to contend on the one hand that the Occupying Power is prevented from taking 
certain actions, while arguing on the other hand that it may lawfully tolerate private actors 
committing the same actions themselves. Moreover, such a self-contradictory argument would be in 
contrast with the principles of effectiveness and good faith that are relevant for the interpretation of 
any treaty provision, the international humanitarian law conventions included.79 
Article 43 HR is an adequate source of the Occupying Power’s duty to prevent private actors 
from violating international humanitarian law as it regulates in general terms the duties and rights 
that are consequences of the belligerent occupation. In other words, Article 43 HR is the tool 
75
 US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, In re List and Others (Hostages Trial) (1948) 15 AD 632, p. 652.
76
 Germany, British Zone of Control, Control Commission, Court of Criminal Appeal, Grahame v. Director of 
Prosecutions (1947) 14 AD 228, p. 232.
77
 Supreme Court of Israel, A Cooperative Society Lawfully Registered in the Judea and Samaria Region v. Commander 
of the IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria Region et al, HCJ 393/82, 37(4) PD (1983) 785.
78
 See UK, Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004), section 11.46; US Department of Defence, Law 
of War Manual (June 2015), section 11.18.5.2.
79
 A treaty must be interpreted in good faith according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 
Article 31(1); the principle of effectiveness was applied in some decisions by the ICJ (first time in Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada) (Judgment) [1988] ICJ Rep 432, para. 52) and it is considered to be a component of 
teleological interpretation pursuant to Article 31(1). See Dörr (2012), p. 539 and pp. 549-550.
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through which international law imposes some obligations on a state due to its effective control 
over a portion of territory. However, it also burdens the Occupying Power with the responsibilities 
to restore and ensure public order and civil life, and these obligations may not be fulfilled if the 
Occupying Power allows private actors to violate international humanitarian law. 
Furthermore, if new legislation is required in order to issue concessions and contracts regarding 
the exploitation of natural resources, the duty not to pass new legislation in violation of the law in 
force in the occupied territory prevents the Occupying Power from explicitly allowing private 
actors’ acts of exploitation.80In these circumstances, every exploitation carried out with the consent 
of the Occupying Power would be pursuant to Article 43 HR, while every exploitation conducted 
without such a legislative authorisation would be devoid of any legal basis – and thus it should be 
repressed by the Occupying Power pursuant to its duty to maintain order in the occupied territory.81 
State practice and international case law confirms that Article 43 HR is the source of a duty of 
vigilance regarding the violations of international humanitarian law by private actors. According to 
the US Law of War Manual, ‘[t]he Occupying Power has a general duty to maintain public order 
and to provide for the preservation of rights of the inhabitants, including rights to their private 
property.’82 In the framework of Article 43 HR, this conclusion does not mean the Occupying 
Power has to refrain from violating individuals’ property rights – a matter discussed in another 
section of the US Law of War Manual;83 rather, it refers to the duty of vigilance of the Occupying 
Power with regard to private property, as affirmed by relevant national and international case law.84 
Clearly, this duty pertains to the protection of private property pursuant to the law in force in the 
occupied territory before the occupation. However, it can be read as pertaining to the protection  of 
both public and private property pursuant to international humanitarian law as well. To this regard, 
the US Law of War Manual itself openly acknowledge that ‘[m]litary occupation of enemy territory 
80
 It is noteworthy that the Republic of Azerbaijan, which considers the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to be occupied by 
Armenia, affirms that exploitation of natural resources in the area is illegal also because Armenia does not comply with 
the Azerbaijani laws regarding permission and licenses, which are allegedly covered by Article 43 HR (see Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Illegal Economic and Other Activities in the Occupied Territories of 
Azerbaijan (2016) pp. 91-92, 
www.mfa.gov.az/files/file/MFA_Report_on_the_occupied_territories_March_2016_1.pdf). On the controversial issue 
regarding the qualification of Nagorno-Karabakh as occupied territory, see Ronzitti (2014), pp. 39-42.
81
 Obviously, contracts concluded and licenses issued before the beginning of the occupation may be implemented, 
since they are based on the law in force in the occupied territory before the occupation. See Bekker (2003).
82
 US Department of Defence, supra n. 78, section 11.5.
83
 Ibid., section 11.18.
84
 See Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 159 (1913): ‘The protocol of August 12, 1898 (30 Stat. 1742) […] 
left our Government, by its military forces, in the occupation and control of Porto Rico as a colony of Spain, and bound 
by the principles of international law to do whatever was necessary to secure public safety, social order, and the 
guaranties of private property.’ See also US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, supra n. 75, p. 652.
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involves a complicated, trilateral set of legal relations between the Occupying Power, the 
temporarily ousted sovereign authority, and the inhabitants of occupied territory.’85 
As to the international case law supporting the existence of such a duty of vigilance regarding 
private actors’ acts in breach of international humanitarian law, first, one has to mention the 
findings of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, according to which:
Whether or not Ethiopian military personnel were directly involved in the looting and 
stripping of buildings in the town, Ethiopia, as the Occupying Power, was responsible for 
the maintenance of public order, for respecting private property, and for preventing pillage. 
Consequently, Ethiopia is liable for permitting the unlawful looting and stripping of 
buildings in the town during the period of its occupation.86
Although this paragraph refers to destruction and seizure of private property, it is extremely 
relevant in the framework of private actors’ illegal exploitation of natural resources for several 
reasons. First, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission bases the Occupying Power’s responsibility on 
duties embodied in Article 43 HR combined with the specific international humanitarian law 
provisions regarding private property in occupied territory.87 In this case, Article 43 HR is the basis 
for the Occupying Power’s duty to prevent the commission of that same conduct that it may not 
carry out directly pursuant to the law of occupation. Second, this duty is inherent to the situation of 
occupation since ‘Ethiopia is not liable for damages [that] . . . occurred either before or after its 
occupation of the town.’88 Third, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commision’s reasoning is applicable 
to other conduct that is per se prohibited to the Occupying Power, and that the Occupying Power 
must prevent private actors from performing pursuant to Article 43 HR; this last consideration is 
also supported by the fact that the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission’s dictum regarded pillage, a 
word that is today commonly construed as pertaining also to the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources.89  
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission’s conclusion regarding a duty of prevention 
incumbent upon the Occupying Power pertaining to the conduct of private actors was 
authoritatively confirmed a year later by the ICJ. In the DRC v Uganda case, the ICJ considered that 
Article 43 HR is the source of the Occupying Power’s obligation regarding private actors: 
85
 US Department of Defence, supra n. 78, section 11.4.
86
 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award: Central Front - Eritrea's Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 22, 28 April 
2004, para. 67 (emphasis added). 
87
 Ibid., fn 29: ‘Hague Regulations, supra note 15, at arts. 43, 46, 47.’ 
88
 Ibid., para. 67.
89
 See supra section 3.
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Uganda was under an obligation, according to Art. 43 HR, to take all the measures in its 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety in the occupied area . 
. . This obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable rules of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the 
inhabitants of the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such 
violence by any third party. 90
Correctly, and in accordance with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission’s case law, the ICJ 
emphasised that this duty regarding private actors’ activity is typical of the situation of belligerent 
occupation. In the ICJ’s own words, 
. . . the fact that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri district extends Uganda’s 
obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent the looting, plundering and exploitation 
of natural resources in the occupied territory to cover private persons in this district and not 
only members of Ugandan military forces.91
Reading this paragraph a contrario, one has to conclude that, had Uganda not been the 
Occupying Power in Ituri, it would not have been responsible for acts of private actors in violation 
of international humanitarian law.92
This conclusion is consistent with the nature of belligerent occupation, a situation in which 
governmental functions are exercised on the basis of de facto control over a territory, rather than a 
legal title. The duty incumbent upon the Occupying Power is similar to states’ obligation not to 
allow private actors under their jurisdiction to use their territory in order to cause harm to other 
states.93 In the instant case, the Occupying Power has to prevent private actors under its jurisdiction 
from doing harm to another state, that is the sovereign of the occupied territory that has been 
temporally ousted, but which retains its rights in relation to that territory, integrity of its natural 
resources included. As affirmed by the ICJ, the absence of a legal title over the territory is irrelevant 
90
 DRC v. Uganda, supra n. 4, para. 158. See also para. 250.
91
 Ibid, para. 248.
92
 This conclusion was endorsed by International Law Association, which made express reference to the ICJ case law in 
order to affirm that the Occupying Power have obligations of this kind. See ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in 
International Law, Second Report (June 2014), p. 18, www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/574BBB1E-32EA-48C6-
94ACDF79A22B8477. 
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for the instant issue, since ‘physical  control  of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of  
title, is the basis of State liability for  acts  affecting  other States’.94 This is particularly true in times 
of belligerent occupation, when the Occupying Power, thanks to its factual and effective control 
over the territory, has the duty to exercises governmental functions in order to restore and ensure 
public order and civil life pursuant to Article 43 HR.95 When such control is not effective, it is more 
difficult to identify a duty of vigilance in armed conflict.96
For these reasons, Article 43 HR is better suited to be considered the source of the Occupying 
Power’s duty to prevent private actors’ violations of international humanitarian law.  
4.4 Nature and Scope of the Duty of Vigilance Against Private Actors’ Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law
According to the ICJ, the Occupying Power’s duty regarding illegal exploitation carried out by 
private actors is a duty of vigilance.97 In other words, the Occupying Power’s responsibility is a 
consequence of the violation of a primary rule – Article 43 HR or, less convincingly, common 
Article 1 – but it is triggered by private actors’ activities that are in conflict with the international 
humanitarian law provisions regarding exploitation of natural resources.98
This kind of obligation encompasses two related duties: the duty of vigilance and the duty to 
punish private actors’ violations if they occur.99 The Occupying Power can punish those private 
actors through the judicial system of the occupied territory and its own military courts.100
94
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para. 118. See also 
Lozano Contreras (2006),  pp. 168–172.
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 See Haupais (2007), pp. 131–133. Mutatis mutandis, this was the conclusion regarding the duty of the Occupying 
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explored by Pertile (2016), pp. 400–406.
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The duty of vigilance pursuant to Article 43 HR is a duty of conduct, rather than a duty of 
result. According to some authors, every obligation in Article 43 HR is an obligation of conduct.101 
Roberto Ago introduced the distinction between obligations of conduct (or of means) and of result 
in the work of the International Law Commission regarding state responsibility; according to Ago, 
an obligation of conduct demands a state to achieve a certain result and specify the means through 
which the state must attain that result.102 Ago’s definition does not correspond to what civil law 
systems consider an obligation of conduct, and so it was not included in the final Draft Articles and 
is considered incorrect by the majority of publicists.103 On the basis of the concept elaborated by 
civil law traditions, today, an obligation of conduct require states ‘to deploy adequate means, to do 
the outmost, to obtain [a] result’.104
The main character of obligations of conduct is that a state under such an obligation is not 
automatically responsible if an event in violation of its obligation occurs; on the contrary, the state 
may demonstrate that it has endeavoured to prevent that violation, and, thus, it does not incur 
international responsibility.105 However, this does not mean that the state’s behaviour and choices 
may not be contested before a competent court;106 rather, the state that failed to perform adequate 
prevention and vigilance may avoid its international responsibility if it demonstrates that its 
behaviour was characterised by due diligence.107
The assessment of due diligence is not easy,108 and must be conducted in concreto,109 on the 
basis of several factors such as the degree of control of the state (rectius: the Occupying Power), the 
importance of the interest to be protected in the specific situation, the degree of predictability of the 
violation, and the degree of risk involved.110 In other words, the Occupying Power has to adopt all 
101
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the ‘reasonably appropriate’111 measures at its disposal pursuant to the law of occupation in order to 
ensure private actors’ respect for international humanitarian law.
Accordingly, the Occupying Power is released from responsibility if it demonstrates that it has 
carried out a diligent policy of vigilance over and punishment of private actors’ illegal exploitation 
of natural resources.
4.5 Consequences in Terms of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
In cases of illegal exploitation committed by private actors, they are the only individuals that 
may possibly be prosecuted for the war crime of pillaging if their behavior falls into the definition 
of this crime and the relevant conditions for the prosecution are met.112
The organs of the Occupying Power who failed in their vigilance – even showing a lack of due 
diligence – are not to be prosecuted since they themselves have not violated the international 
humanitarian law rules regarding the exploitation of natural resources. They only violated a duty 
embodied in Article 43 HR, whose breach, however serious, does not constitute a war crime under 
the ICC Statute. Accordingly, those state organs may not be individually prosecuted at the 
international level, although their behavior is able to trigger state responsibility.
Moreover, their individual criminal responsibility is excluded under Article 28 ICC Statute 
regarding responsibility of commanders and other superiors. It is true that, according to treaty and 
customary law, commanders and superiors may be held responsible for not having prevented and 
punished war crimes committed by their subordinates.113 However, private actors illegally 
exploiting natural resources in the occupied territory are not considered subordinates of the military 
commander of the area – meaning that they would be de facto organs rather than private actors. 
Conversely, Article 28 ICC Statute requires a legal or factual hierarchical relationship between the 
commander(s) and the perpetrator(s) of the crime(s), a requirement that is not present in case of 
illegal exploitation of natural resources by private actors.114
More generally, belligerent occupation is control over territory, not control over individuals. 
Accordingly, one may not claim that the occupation implies such an obtrusive control over every 
individual dwelling in the area and that they are all subordinates of the military commander. The 
Occupying Power’s control is similar to the control exercised by a state over its own territory, and 
111
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state officials are not considered automatically commanders or superiors of every individual under 
their jurisdiction. A different conclusion would turn the Occupying Power’s obligation of conduct 
into an obligation of result for the purposes of international criminal law.
In light of the above, when acts of illegal exploitation are committed by private actors, the 
Occupying Power may be held responsible for not having diligently prevented them, but only the 
private actors – and not state organs – may be prosecuted for the international crimes.115
5 Conclusive Remarks
The interplay between public and private actors in the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
in the occupied territory is the source of a number of complex issues related to international state 
responsibility and individual criminal liability. 
The correct identification of the relevant international norms applicable to the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources is the cornerstone of every attempt to hold the Occupying Power 
and its organs accountable for illegal exploitation. As this paper sought to demonstrate, it is 
important to make a distinction between two different situations: illegal exploitation may be carried 
out by the Occupying Power’s organs (either de jure and de facto), or by private actors. In the first 
case, the Occupying Power may be held directly responsible for violations of the international 
humanitarian law rules regarding the exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory, and 
its organs individually may face international criminal prosecution for those conduct. 
In contrast, when the illegal exploitation is carried out by private actors, the Occupying Power 
may be held responsible only for not having prevented that illegal exploitation on the basis of a duty 
of vigilance pursuant to Article 43 HR, according to which the territorial control gained manu 
militari demands that the Occupying Power prevent individuals that are in the occupied territory 
from illegally exploiting the natural resources present therein. This responsibility is vested in the 
Occupying Power because international law always considers internationally responsible for acts of 
private actors those states that exercise governmental functions over the territory where those actors 
carry out their activity – irrespective of any legal title at the basis of this exercise. However, since 
this duty of vigilance is an obligation of conduct, illegal exploitation by private actors triggers the 
Occupying Power’s international responsibility only if the state fails to demonstrate that it had 
exercised its powers in order to prevent that illegal conduct. When the exploitation of natural 
resources is carried out by private actors, the Occupying Power’s organs who failed in their 
115
 The International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg has envisaged the possibility of prosecuting private actors for war 
crimes such as companies and corporations. On this topic, see Marston Danner (2006); Jessberger (2010). 
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vigilance may not be held responsible individually for war crimes since a serious violation of 
Article 43 HR is not considered to be a war crime by any international criminal justice instrument. 
In light of the above, it is clear that, today, the law of belligerent occupation must take into 
consideration even private actors, and not only the Occupying Power, the ousted sovereign, and the 
population of the occupied territory, which are the traditional stakeholders during occupations. This 
proliferation of actors involved in the occupation further complicates the individuation of the 
relevant international norms and path of state and individual accountability.
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